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Despite James Madison's admonition that "three pence" is too much
for the government to spend on religion,1 the United States maintains a
military chaplaincy program at an annual cost of eighty-five million dol-
lars.' According to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, this is money
well-spent: In the recent case of Katcoff v. Marsh the court stated that
"the morale of our soldiers, their willingness to serve, and the efficiency of
the Army as an instrument for our national defense rests in substantial
part on the military chaplaincy, which is vital to our Army's function-
ing."' The establishment clause, however, prohibits governmental support
and control of religion, no matter how beneficent." To date, no court, in-
cluding the Katcoff court, has subjected the military chaplaincy program
to the rigorous scrutiny required by the establishment clause.
Although standing problems5 and a tradition of deference to the mili-
tary" have allowed the Supreme Court to avoid considering the issue, sev-
1. J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS (1784),
reprinted in part in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 65 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
2. Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223, 229 (2d Cir. 1985).
3. Id. at 237. In implying that the government has delegated secular responsibility for the Army's
functioning to religion, the court does not address the question of whether such delegation is prohib-
ited by the establishment clause. But see Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963)
(government cannot use religious exercise to promote secular purposes); Larkin v. Grendel's Den,
Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 123-24 (1982) (valid secular purpose can and should be achieved without delegat-
ing governmental functions to religious institutions); see also infra note 113. Katcoff is currently on
remand to the District Court to consider whether government financing of a military chaplaincy is in
certain circumstances "relevant to and reasonably necessary for the conduct of our national defense
." Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 238.
4. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962) (First Amendment adopted to "guarantee that
neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to control, support or
influence" religion).
5. See generally Weber, The First Amendment and the Military Chaplaincy, 22 J. CHURCH &
STATE 459, 462 (1980) (standing problem has impeded judicial consideration of constitutionality of
military chaplaincy). See also infra notes 11, 12 and accompanying text (discussing standing issue in
Katcoft).
6. Goldman v. Weinberger, 54 U.S.L.W. 4298, 4299 (Mar. 25, 1986) (courts defer to military
authorities when evaluating whether military needs justify particular restriction on religiously moti-
vated conduct); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 65-66, 70 (1981) (broad congressional constitu-
tional power over military; court's lack of competence on military issues warrants judicial deference).
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eral Justices have cited the military chaplaincy as an example of permissi-
ble government accommodation of religion.7 In holding that the existence
of the military chaplaincy does not violate the establishment clause, the
Second Circuit in Katcoff explicitly focused on the free exercise interests
of military personnel, concluding that the current program is a permissi-
ble means of reaching a constitutionally required end." The means-the
chaplaincy-meets the "appropriate standard of relevancy to our national
defense and reasonable necessity."9 Applying this standard, the court up-
held "the great majority of the Army's existing chaplaincy activities." 10
Because the plaintiffs, to gain standing, formulated their case as a chal-
lenge to government use of tax money to fund the program,11 the court
concentrated its assessment on the funding question. In reaching its hold-
ing that private funding could not maintain the current program, the
court did not examine the feasibility of changing other elements of this
program to make it conform more strictly to establishment clause
principles. 12
See also infra note 96 for a discussion of the principle of military necessity. Compare United States v.
Burry, 36 C.M.R. 829, 831 (C.G.C.M.S. 1966) (no First Amendment right to refuse military order to
cook on Sabbath) with Sherbert v. Verner 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (disqualification for unemploy-
ment compensation solely because of refusal to work on Sabbath imposes unconstitutional burden on
free exercise). See generally Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84
COLUM. L. REv. 387 (1984) (arguing that courts should review constitutional claims against military
except when political doctrine would bar review). Cf. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military
Uniqueness and Servicemen's Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L. REv. 177, 253 (1984) (political pro-
cess, not courts, should be responsible for balancing military efficacy against individual constitutional
rights). These problems suggest that the more promising forum for confronting and acting upon the
constitutionally problematic nature of the current military chaplaincy may be Congress.
7. Some Justices use the chaplaincy example to support other government recognitions, if not
subsidies, of religion, Lynch v. Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1360 (1984) (public funding of military
chaplains cited to support public funding of creche); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 449 n.4 (1962)
(Stewart, J., dissenting) (same, to support prayer in public school); Abington School Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 309 (1963) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (same); McCollum v. Board of Educa-
tion, 333 U.S. 203, 254 (1948) (Reed, J., dissenting) (same, to support using public schools for stu-
dents' religious instruction), while other Justices use it to deny such recognition and subsidy, Abing-
ton, 374 U.S. at 296-98 (Brennan, J., concurring) (although government provisions for military
chaplaincy are arguably justifiable by military depriving free exercise opportunity, providing for
prayer in public schools is not justifiable by any analogous deprivation to students); see also Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3346 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (restating support for military
chaplaincy, but denying support for legislative chaplaincy). But see id. at 3337 & n.2 (Brennan, J.,
retracting his earlier endorsement of legislative chaplains in Abington concurrence).
8. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 234, 237.
9. Id. at 235, 237.
10. Id. at 237. Some practices of the program, however, such as advertising chaplain activities to
the civilian public, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE CHAPLAIN FIELD MANUAL 16-5, ch. 2-19
(1977) [hereinafter cited as THE CHAPLAIN], seem neither relevant to nor reasonably necessary for
military defense.
11. The plaintiffs argued that they came within the Flast v. Cohen taxpayer standing require-
ments, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (taxpayer standing requires challenge to congressional exercise of its con-
stitutional taxing and spending power, and nexus between taxpayer status and constitutional
infringement).
12. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 235, 236. This implies that standing requirements are still an impedi-
ment to comprehensive judicial consideration of the issue.
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This Note assumes that some military chaplaincy program would be an
appropriate means of protecting service persons' free exercise rights."3 But
because military involvement with religion implicates grave establishment
clause concerns, it is essential that the chaplaincy program be finely tai-
lored to minimize the establishment offense. This Note measures the cur-
rent chaplaincy program against the two central establishment clause
principles: neutrality and nonentanglement.14 After demonstrating that the
current program offends both principles, this Note proposes an alternative
system that would significantly diminish these offenses.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE MILITARY
CHAPLAINCY TODAY
While justified as a means of meeting service persons' free exercise
needs,15 the military chaplaincy is also designed to encourage religion 6
and to implement a military vision of religion that enhances secular mili-
tary values such as morale, patriotism, and the national interest.17 This
13. The military demands strict control over its personnel in the name of national security. See,
e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 357 (1980) (military need for internal discipline justifies military
regulation requiring service members to obtain commander's approval to circulate petitions on Air
Force base). The rigid control exercised by the military over its personnel may deprive people of the
opportunity for religious worship. Therefore, some government accommodation may be necessary to
insure that service personnel are able to act upon their free exercise rights. The government can
accommodate some religious interests, even when not compelled to do so, without violating the estab-
lishment clause. Abington, 374 U.S. at 299 (Brennan, J., concurring) (government provision of prison
and military chaplains to those cut off by state from religious opportunity may be permissible, though
not required, under establishment clause principles). Government "can dose its doors or suspend its
operations as to those who want to repair to their religious sanctuary for worship or instruction,"
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1952), but it must be "neutral when it comes to competi-
tion between sects," id. and "[iut may not thrust any sect on any person." Id. The Katcoff court
observed: "Unless there were chaplains ready to move simultaneously with the troops and to tend to
their spiritual needs as they face possible death, the soldiers would be left in the lurch, religiously
speaking." Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228. See also Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and
Doctrinal Development. Part I. The Nonestablishment Principle, 81 HARV. L. REV. 513, 525 &
nn.32-33 (1968) (principle of government neutrality in religious matters together with tradition of
government involvement makes military chaplaincy constitutional).
14. See infra notes 93-94.
15. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 224, 228.
16. The Chaplain Field Manual specifies: "Service members should be returned to civilian life,
upon the conclusion of their tour of duty, strengthened in their religious outlook and more devoted
citizens." THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 2-12. See id. at 2-3 (chaplain activities to encourage
troops' religious interest); id. at ch. 5-15; infra note 18 (discussing of Navy Chaplains' duties); see
also DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, THE RESERVE COMPONENTS CHAPLAIN PROGRAM 1A Pam 165-
2(4) 2 (1977) [hereinafter cited as THE RESERVE CHAPLAIN] (chaplains' presence, in unique, visible
way, "indicates to all that religion is a part of all life. . . . Religion is not something to be compart-
mentalized, or reserved for some special, often irrelevant, segment of life."). The pamphlet on the
Catholic chaplaincy notes that an estimated '70 to 80 percent of those [Catholics] who had been
neglecting the practice of their faith return to the Mass and Sacraments during their recruit training.
An amazing gift of grace...." MILITARY VICARIATE, CATHOLIC CHAPLAINS 2 (Sept. 1984) (em-
phasis in original).
17. See infra note 20. The military's enthusiastic encouragement of religious activity lends sup-
port for the suspicion that the military appropriates the chaplaincy for its own secular interests. The
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design has both permitted significant military influence over religion and
generated conflict between the chaplains' allegiance to religious and mili-
tary interests.
A. Military Regulation of the Commissioned Chaplaincy
A chaplain's religious and military duties are both described in the
Army Regulations as "those which normally pertain to the clergy profes-
sion and those which are prescribed by law, modified by the mission and
distinctive conditions and circumstances of the Department of the
Army.""8 Army regulations do not specify the effect that the "distinctive
conditions" and the "mission" of the Army have on religion, but the chap-
laincy system is designed to promote a vision of religion that is pluralist,
ecumenical, and patriotic, minimizing the distinctions within 9 and be-
tween"° religious groups.
military views chaplains as leaders in "humanitarian services, and in such cultural undertakings as
may contribute to the strengthening of the moral program of the unit. . . ." THE CHAPLAIN, supra
note 10, at ch. 1-1. See supra text accompanying note 3. The Chaplain Field Manual instructs chap-
lains that "[t]he liason and rapport that the chaplain is able to effect with indigenous religious groups
and leaders may be of inestimable value . . . to the national interests of the United States." THE
CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 4-2. It is clear that the military perceives the chaplaincy, including
the secular duties, as enhancing national security. In Katcoff, this benefit implicitly added to the
present program's credibility: The court asserts that a failure to satisfy a soldier's free exercise rights
would "diminish morale, thereby weakening our national defense." Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228.
18. UNITED STATES, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION § 165-20 1 2-1a (1976)
[hereinafter cited as ARMY REG.]. The chaplain's mission includes religious services and education,
pastoral care, and "human self development" programs. Id. at 1 2-3. Mandatory religious duties
include performance of burial services, sacraments, rites, and ordinances; performing marriages is
permitted. All must conform "to the respective beliefs and conscientious practices of all concerned." 32
C.F.R. § 510.1 (1985). See also 10 U.S.C. § 3547 (1982) (Army chaplains, "when practicable," hold
appropriate religious services on Sundays and perform burials). While this inquiry will focus on the
status of the Army's military chaplaincy, other military service branches face similar problems. Air
Force chaplains have religious duties identical to those of their Army counterparts. 10 U.S.C. § 8547
(1982). While Navy chaplains' duties are also similar, the Navy takes an even more encouraging
approach to religion by "earnestly recommendling] to all officers, seamen, and others in the naval
service diligently to attend at every performance of the worship of Almighty God." 10 U.S.C. §
6031(b) (1982).
19. For example, although in civilian society there are at least three distinct Jewish movements in
the United States-Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform, in the military, the three movements are
merged into one. Major Marc Abromowitz, West Point's full-time Jewish Chaplain explains, "'It's a
military service,' ... '[m]ilitary means it meets the needs of all Jews. We don't ascribe [sic] any
particular denomination.'" N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1984, at B1, col. 5.
20. Chaplains are to be "qualified to provide for the free exercise of religion by all members of
the Military Services . . . ." 32 C.F.R. § 65.4(a)(iii) (1985). Although chaplains cannot be required
to participate in ecumenical or interfaith services when prohibited by denominational or ecclesiastical
law, ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-2b (1976), "[a]n appreciation for and emphasis on plurality in ministry
will be cultivated in every educational setting." U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL, FORT
MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY, CHAPLAIN OFFICER BASIC COURSE 21 (in use in 1984) [hereinafter cited
as BASic HANDBOOK]. To accomplish this, chaplains are trained in "developing teamwork and a
spirit of cooperation and unity among chaplains of diverse faith groups and denominations." U.S.
ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL, FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY, CHAPLAIN OFFICER
BASIC PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION 14 (in use in 1984) [hereinafter cited as BASIC INSTRUCTION].
Requiring the Director of Religious Education to use the Unified (Cooperative) Curriculum, ARMY
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The government also influences religious exercise by dictating who may
become a chaplain. The Department of Defense promulgates criteria for
both the agencies that endorse chaplains2" and the applicants they en-
dorse.22 Regulations require that prospective chaplains be endorsed by re-
ligious endorsing agencies,2 8 be able to meet the requirements established
by military departments,2 4 and be able to provide professional staff sup-
port in the military. 5 Finally, a chaplain must have a college degree and
three years of seminary training.26 Aside from these "objective" endorse-
ment criteria, applicants must be "qualified spiritually, morally, intellec-
tually, and emotionally to serve as a chaplain of the Military Services. 27
These criteria systematically exclude large sectors of various religious
groups. 28
After entering the military, the chaplain's work not only blurs distinc-
tions between religions, but often merges or conflates religious and mili-
tary functions.29 Chaplains participate in military and patriotic ceremo-
REG. 165-20 2-10(5) (1977) also promotes the military's homogenous vision of religion. The army
has developed and funds this curriculum "to provide a comprehensive religious education program for
the armed forces. . . .Protestant, Catholic, and Jewish materials [are] available." THE CHAPLAIN,
supra note 10, at ch. 3-12.
21. To achieve the requisite recognition by the Armed Forces Chaplains Board as an endorsing
agency, a "religious faith group" must be organized "to provide religious services to a lay constitu-
ency;" be able to exercise ecclesiastical authority to grant, withdraw, and continually validate, ecclesi-
astical endorsements; be able to "endorse clergy who are qualified to provide for the free exercise of
religions by all members of the Military Services;" and "[albide by the applicable regulations and
policies of the Department of Defense." Nomination of Chaplains for the Military Services, 32
C.F.R. § 65.4(b) (1985).
22. Id. § 65.4(a).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 65.4(d).
25. Id. § 64.4.
26. The Department of Defense believes that the minimum education requirement insures that
chaplains can communicate with soldiers of all ranks and can coordinate religious programs at instal-
lations, Brief for Appellees at 14, Katcoff v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985), though these
standards do not apply to civilian clergy who serve on a contract basis, ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-9(2)
(1977). Chaplain applicants must have completed theological training at a graduate school listed in
the Education Directory, Colleges and Universities, or accredited in the Directory, ATS [American
Association of Theological Schools] Bulletin Part 4, or at a school whose credits are accepted by
either of these. 32 C.F.R. § 65.4(c) (1985). These requirements effectively exclude from the Army
chaplaincy "some United Church of Christ clergy, over half of the American Baptist clergy, and
almost all the clergy of some other denominations... ." UNrrED CHURcH OF CHRIsr, MINIsTRIES
TO MILrrARY PERSONNEL 30 (1973) [hereinafter cited as UCC REPORT].
27. 32 C.F.R. § 65.4(a)(iii) (1985). A board dominated by military personnel, including the major
command chaplain, evaluates chaplain applicants. Jonakait, The Abuses of the Military Chaplaincy,
ACLU REPORTS 5-8 (May 1973) [hereinafter cited as ACLU REPORT] (citing ARMY REG. 601-
126(8)(c)(1)). The vague endorsement standards leave great discretion to military authorities, leading
critics to suspect that the Military Chaplain Board screens out applicants who are not devoted to
military goals. Id. (citing example of such screening and dearth of factual evidence due to Army's
refusal to release information); see also UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 65 (decrying government
screening authority).
28. See supra note 26.
29. One manifestation of this conflation is the Military Chaplain's Association of the United
States of America, a national association of chaplains and former chaplains, chartered by Congress:
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nies which, though marked by invocations, prayers, readings and
benedictions, are defined in the regulations as military exercises, not reli-
gious services.30 In addition, some chaplain duties are overtly secular,31
such as "assist[ing] the commander and staff in the integration of the
principles of good moral conduct and citizenship into the training program
and the total life of the command. '3 2
The military further influences chaplain activity and allegiance by inte-
grating the chaplain into the military chain of command. The chaplain is
a uniformed,3  ranked3 4 officer3 5 who may not exercise command.38 The
"(a) To safeguard and to strengthen the forces of faith and morality of our Nation; (b) to perpetuate
and to deepen the bonds of understanding and friendship of our military service; (c) to preserve our
spiritual influence and interest in all members and veterans of the armed forces; (d) to uphold the
Constitution of the United States; and (e) to promote justice, peace, and good will." 36 U.S.C. §§ 311,
313 (1982) (title covers "Patriotic Societies and Observances").
30. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-2f (1976). This characterization protects the military from free exer-
cise violations: Military personnel attend religious services voluntarily, id. at I 3-4b (1977), but may
be required to attend military exercises. Although chaplains are not required to take part in such
ceremonies, the military's training of chaplains to conduct portions of these ceremonies, B.ssc IN-
STRUCTION, supra note 20, at 11, and the chaplains' dependence on the commander, see infra text
accompanying notes 37-40, encourage chaplains to participate. See infra note 78 and accompanying
text.
31. The military rationalizes its appropriation of chaplain resources for secular duties, claiming:
"[T]he chaplain, because of his close relationship with the soldiers in his unit, often serves as a liason
between the soldiers and their commanders, advising the latter of racial unrest, drug or alcohol abuse,
and other problems affecting the morale and efficiency of the unit, and helps to find solutions."
Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 228. The UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 75, objects to using religion "to
control the perennial problems generated by military life itself," claiming it "inhibits the chaplain
from focusing religion and ethics on the system ...."
32. THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 1-2. See also ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-3, 2-4(12)
(1976). The senior chaplain advises the commander and staff on moral and ethical dimensions of
leadership and human self development. Id. at 1 2-4(2). See also THE RESERVE CHAPLAIN supra
note 16, at 2 (commander may ask chaplain to teach "classes which help unit members deal with
problems of identity, separation from family, personal problems, self-fulfillment, etc."); BAsic IN-
STRUCTION, supra note 20, at 18 (chaplain to acquire skills "for effectively identifying and con-
fronting unjust procedures and actions"). The military's design for chaplain training-"to produce a
comprehensive chaplaincy motivated in support of the basic mission of the Army," ARMY REG. 165-
20 1 2-4(1)-may encourage chaplains to substitute secular criteria for their own criteria in judging
these standards. Chaplains also contribute to crime prevention programs. THE: CHAPLAIN, supra note
10, at ch. 2-2(k).
33. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-2 (1976).
34. 10 U.S.C. §3528 (1982). Chaplains were not given ranked status until the end of World
War I. Rycroft, Is the Military Chaplaincy Constitutional?, 37 CHURCH & STATE 20 (1984). All
chaplains are officially addressed as "chaplain" regardless of military grade or professional title. The
military grade is indicated in writing in parentheses, though religious title is not. Army Reg. 165-20 11
2-1(g) (1976).
35. 10 U.S.C. §§ 3581, 3073 (1982). The effects of the chaplain's rank and uniform on his or her
ability to minister to military personnel is controversial. The UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 43,
found that the chaplain's officer status widens the gap between enlisted youth and the chaplains. See
also UPC REPORT, infra note 73, at B-31 (calling for study on effects of chaplains' rank and uniform
on soldiers' perception of them). Alexander de Tocqueville observed: "In democratic nations, the man
who becomes an officer severs all ties . . . to civil life. . . .His true country is the army, since he
owes all he has to the rank he has attained in it; he therefore follows the fortunes of the army and
rises or sinks with it." De Tocqueville, Democracy and the Army, in GARRISONS AND GOVERNMENT
59, 62 (McWilliams ed. 1967).
36. 10 U.S.C. § 3581 (1982).
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commanding officer has significant influence over chaplain activities.
Commanding officers write the report upon which each chaplain's promo-
tion depends, 7 "based solely on [the chaplain's] military performance and
not on his effectiveness as a cleric."38 Staff chaplains are responsible to the
commander for chaplain related activities within the command,39 while
commanders, in turn, are responsible for chaplain activities under their
command 40 Finally, political and military authorities choose the Chief of
Chaplains,"' whose responsibilities include approving chaplain applicants,
overseeing resource allocation, and developing programs concerning reli-
gious and moral needs of military personnel.42
The commander's stamp of approval-promotion-brings authority
over subordinates and greater respect from military ranks,43 and, at the
rank of Captain or Major, requires the chaplain to receive additional
training in military doctrine and organization." Hence, the chaplain's
role in the military is colored both by an incentive for advancement based
on military standards of performance, and by a training program for ad-
vancement that emphasizes military concerns.
Military control over the availability of religious items and facilities
also affects the chaplain's religious mission. Regulations mandate fair and
equitable scheduling of chapel services between religious groups, but give
general Protestant services, which appeal to a wide range of Protestants,
37. ACLU REPORT, supra note 27, at 27. Studies show that soldiers feel chaplains are more
interested in appeasing officers for advancement purposes than attending to soldiers' needs. Id. at
46-47 (citing Seigel, Revamping the Military Chaplaincy, 79 CHRISTIAN CENTURY 959 (1962)).
38. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226.
39. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-4a (1976). Command policy determines the nature and extent of staff
chaplain supervision of activities, which is to be specified in "unit standing operating procedures."
THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 2-5.
40. ARMY REG. 165-20 T 3-1 (1977).
41. 10 U.S.C. § 3036 (1982) (President, with the advice and consent of Senate, appoints Chief of
Chaplains; board selected by Secretary of Army selects board of general officers, including incumbent
Chief of Chaplains, to recommend officers to President); see also ACLU REPORT, supra note 27, at
26 (objecting to secular military role in selection process).
42. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-8(c) (1976); ARMY REG. 230-36 2-la (1980). The Office of the
Chief of Chaplains has "responsibility for religious, moral leadership and human self development
matters Army-Wide." THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 9, introduction & 1.
43. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-4 (1976).
44. Chaplains serving in their fourth to seventh year in the rank of Captain or Major attend the
Advanced Chaplain Course for six months for training in additional supervisory and management
skills for the ministry. Letter from U.S. Army Chaplain (Colonel) Archie T. Roberts, Director of
Training and Doctrine at Headquarters U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (November 5, 1984).
A comparison of the basic and advanced chaplain training courses reveals that once advancement has
occurred, the military requires chaplains to exhibit a deeper appreciation of the nature and goals of
the military. The advanced chaplains' classes include military tactics and Army Doctrine, defined as
"Army organization and capabilities and the principles of war to include their origins, their action,
interaction and application on the modem battlefield," U.S. ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL,
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY, CHAPLAIN OFFICER ADVANCED PROGRAM OF INSTRUCTION 9
(1984) [hereinafter cited as ADVANCED PROGRAM]; the commander's powers under and philosophies
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice; and procedures for non-judicial punishment. Id. at 17.
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priority over denominational Protestant services.45 Religious items are ap-
propriate for a majority of chaplains within one of the major faith groups
are authorized for purchase with appropriated (use-specific) government
funds, while items that are restricted to a specific denomination's use and
governed by liturgical law can be purchased by non-appropriated
(donated and use-general government) funds.' 6 Commanders, relying on
staff chaplain recommendations, maintain extensive authority over how
appropriated and non-appropriated funds are spent to support chaplaincy
programs.47
B. Auxiliary and Contract Chaplains
The majority of chaplains serving military personnel perform their
ministry as commissioned officers. When chaplain coverage is inadequate,
however, the Army employs auxiliary chaplains who perform duties of a
"purely religious nature," 48 do not wear uniforms,'4 and are individually
appointed on a yearly basis. 50 The endorsing agency must provide ecclesi-
astic endorsement and the Chief of Chaplains must approve each individ-
ual appointment. 51 Commissioned chaplains, or if there are none, com-
manding officers, supervise these auxiliary chaplains. 52
If auxiliary chaplains are also unavailable, the military may contract
"with a recognized religious organization or individuals on a 'nonpersonal
basis' " for the provision of religious services alone,53 leaving the organiza-
tion to choose the individual, with the sole criterion that this person "must
be a fully ordained or accredited clergyperson."' The contract chaplain
system, which removes control of individual appointments from the mili-
tary, leaves little opportunity for military influence upon religious exer-
45. ARMY REG. 165-20 % 2-2d(1) (1976).
46. ARMY REG. 165-20 1 4-13, 4-14 (1977).
47. The commander establishes program objectives for chaplaincy activities and allocates funds
based on whether the chaplain's budget matches these objectives. THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at
ch. 5-8, 1, 2; see also ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-4a(6) (1976) (as part of responsibility to commander,
staff chaplain will "[p]repare estimates and requests of funds for religious activities"). The com-
mander also has the power to approve the purposes for which non-appropriated, "designated" funds
can be collected in chapel services or activities, ARMY REG. 230-36 1-4j(2) (1980); and to establish,
operate, and dissolve the non-appropriated chaplain's fund, which includes the power to appoint
members to chaplain fund councils, id. at 2-1b, 2-1c.
48. ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-8(4) (1976) (duties include "conducting religious services and provid-
ing private ministrations necessary to the religious welfare of individuals within the. . . command."
49. Auxiliary clergy retain their civilian status. Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463, 477
(E.D.N.Y. 1984), affd in part, remanded in part, 755 F.2d 223 (2d Cir. 1985); ARMY REG. 165-20
11 2-8(7) (1976).
50. ARMY REG. 165-20 % 2-8c(6) (1976).
51. Id. at % 2-8c(5).
52. Id. at I 2-8a(3).
53. ARMY REG. 165-20 2-9a(1) (1977).
54. Id. at 2-9(2).
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cise. Regulations authorize the hiring of such contract chaplains only as a
last resort, however. 55 While recognizing that civilian chaplains are effec-
tive in providing religious and spiritual support,56 the military rejects the
idea that civilian, non-government funded chaplains could replace the cur-
rent chaplaincy program.57 This longstanding military policy58 may reflect
the military's desire to maintain authority over chaplains. 'Military au-
thorities fear that extensive use of civilians to provide services otherwise
performed by military chaplains will suggest that civilian chaplains can,
in fact, replace military chaplains.59 Currently, the military is able to im-
plement its view of the military chaplaincy by controlling who may be a
chaplain, delineating his or her responsibilities, and requiring him or her
to be part of the military command structure. Yet many of these controls
are contrary to the religious beliefs of some groups, and impermissibly
subordinate religious interests to military concerns.
II. RELIGIOUS VIEWS OF THE CHAPLAINCY
Religious views 0 of the chaplain's role in the military vary. A religion's
willingness or reluctance to relinquish its authority over the chaplain in
the name of national security reflects the particular effects of the current
chaplaincy program on that religion. Because religious views vary, the
free exercise of some religions is burdened to a greater extent than is that
of others. These different views also demonstrate the extent to which the
current system fails to accommodate religions' independent visions of the
chaplaincy program, forcing all religions to conform identically to the mil-
itary's program.
55. Id. at 2-9a(1).
56. Katcoff, 582 F. Supp. at 477-78; infra note 57.
57. Katcoff, 582 F. Supp. at 477-78 (citing Declaration of Chaplain (Major General) Patrick
Hessian in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion). The military, in rejecting the replacement of existing
military chaplains with auxiliary civilian chaplains, claims that smaller denominations would be una-
ble to fund a civilian chaplaincy, and that these chaplains, not trained in military subjects, would be
unable to function effectively in the field. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 236.
58. Katcoff, 582 F. Supp. at 477.
59. In an Issue Paper on guidelines for utilizing contract clergy, Chaplain (LTC) Edgren based
his assertion that "[e]xtensive utilization of civilians to provide services normally expected of chaplains
is detrimental to the chaplaincy's interest" on the observation that "[sluch actions merely reinforce the
plaintiff's [Katcoff] argument that civilians can do the job in place of military chaplains." Edgren,
51107 Issue Paper on Contract Clergy, DACH-AMB (late 1982 or early 1983). The Second Circuit
has rejected as controlling military officers' opinions on matters concerning the tension between reli-
gious freedom and military necessity. Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 403 U.S. 1076 (1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (conclusory opinions of military "do not
suffice for the extraordinary showing of military necessity that is required for justification to override
religious freedoms") (footnote omitted). But see Goldman v. Weinberger, 54 U.S.L.W. 4299, 4300
(Mar. 25, 1986) (respecting appropriate military officials' professional judgment on desirability of
dress regulations that proscribe exemptions for the wearing of religious apparel).
60. This examination uses "religious views" to refer to views expressed by religious institutions.
These views do not include the full range of views within a religious tradition. See infra note 65.
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To demonstrate the differential impact of the chaplaincy program on
various religions, I will examine the views of three religious bodies on the
program."1 The Jewish community is representative of religions whose
goals for ministry in the armed forces render the military's program ac-
ceptable. 2 The United Presbyterian Church (UPC) is representative of
those religions that participate reluctantly, realizing that they sacrifice
some religious integrity by conforming to the military's vision of reli-
gion.63 The Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod (WELS) is represen-
tative of groups which, finding that the chaplaincy program unacceptably
contravenes their concept of a military chaplaincy, attempt to minister to
military personnel outside the current program."
A. Jewish Views of the Chaplaincy
Traditional Jewish sources, acknowledging the state's authority to pro-
vide a military and the citizen's obligation to serve,6 5 do not expect the
military to accommodate all of Jewish law. 6 Jewish chaplains similarly
defer to military interests and limit religious demands in light of the "wel-
fare of the country. '61 The Jewish Welfare Board Commission on Jewish
Chaplaincy (CJC)6 accepts th current military chaplaincy program,
stressing the need for religious guidance in the military, the challenge that
ministry in the military offers to rabbis, and the chaplain's importance in
61. Examples of other religions' views which correspond with those of the representative bodies
will also be indicated. The main source of information about these views is material distributed by the
religious agencies responsible for chaplains. Because the views focus on the current chaplaincy system,
they are reacting to the present system, rather than proposing their ideal system. This discussion does
not include religions, such as Quakers, whose principles preclude them from participating in the
military, as either soldiers or chaplains, see Cadbury, Peace and War, in THE QUAKER APPROACH
TO CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 3 (J. Kavanaugh ed. 1953), or religions whose leaders often cannot
meet the government's endorsement requirements, such as the Black Muslims, and hence are ex-
cluded, see Pearce, Black Muslims and the Military Chaplain, 2 MILITARY CHAPLAINS' REVIEW 35,
36 (Aug. 1973) (advanced secular education not important for Muslim ministers, but Muslim educa-
tion important for all members).
62. See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.
63. See infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text.
64. See infra notes 83-88 and accompanying text.
65. See generally L. LANDMAN, JEWISH LAW IN THE DxASPORA 144-46 (1968) (Jewish duty to
serve in the military). But see Gendler, Therefore Choose Life, in JEWISH PEACE FELLOwsHIP,
RoOTs OF JEWISH NONVIOLENCE 7, 10 (1981) (arguing that Jewish tradition does not sanction
either modem nuclear or conventional warfare).
66. LANDMAN, supra note 65, at 145-46 (once military attack has begun, Sabbath and certain
other religious commands, such as dietary laws, may be set aside; in peacetime, however, when provi-
sions are made for Jewish soldiers to abide by rituals, they must do so); see also Deutsch, Kosher
Kitchens in Military Camps, in AMERICAN REFORM RESPONSA 131 (W. Jacob ed. 1983) (military
exigencies justify breaking dietary laws).
67. See Deutsch, supra note 66, at 134.
68. The CJC is composed of 21 rabbis, 7 each from the Orthodox, Conservative, and Reform
movements. JEWISH WELFARE BOARD COMMISSON ON JEWISH CHAPLAINCY, THE MILITARY
CHAPLAINcY-A CHALLENGING ALTERNATIVE, introduction (1983/84) [hereinafter cited as CJC
PAMPHLET].
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preserving the American way of life. 9 The CJC emphasizes the chap-
lain's -religious goals70 and extols the challenge of offering spiritual guid-
ance to Jews of different backgrounds and convictions while not violating
the rabbi's own conscience.71 Despite this encouragement, from 1950 to
1969 the three major rabbinical bodies, Orthodox, Conservative, and Re-
form, had to require that all qualified, newly ordained rabbis serve for a
limited period, if needed, as military chaplains. 2
B. Views of the United Presbyterian Church
Not all religious institutions agree that the military chaplaincy does not
threaten religious principles. The United Presbyterian Church is critical
of the current chaplaincy program, but accepts it as a necessary compro-
mise between church and government that engenders "unresolved conflict
in the church."718 The military's ability to usurp church authority over the
chaplain and to undermine the chaplain's allegiance to the church con-
cerns the UPC.7 4 To ensure that "chaplains . . . remain loyal church
members" in the face of tension between military and religious demands,
the church relies on its power to revoke chaplain endorsement.
75
The UPC's publications emphasize chaplains' religious function and
69. Id. at 1-5.
70. "[T]he rabbi is expected to be a clergyman first and foremost." Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 3. The CJO deemphasizes the significance of denominational distinctions between Jews,
describing the military as "[r]emoved from the civilian framework of Orthodox, Conservative and
Reform synagogues striving for membership, publicity and attendance." Id. at 3. The pamphlet ex-
plains that the chaplain is "expected. . .to be true to his own religious persuasion" while serving the
religious and pastoral needs of all Jews. Id.
72. The OJC pamphlet dubs this a "voluntary draft." Id. at 13-16. The pamphlet's laudatory
tone may reflect the CJC's difficulties in finding chaplain applicants. Contrary to the implication of
the pamphlet's assertion, "1400 Rabbis Can't Be Wrong," referring to the number of Jewish rabbis
who have served as military chaplains, some of these chaplains were "drafted" by the Jewish Welfare
Board. Id. at 13-15. The enthusiastic tone may also reflect the CJC's sense that the military chap-
laincy has engendered greater equality for and tolerance of Judaism in American society, as well as
encouraged less sectarian attitudes within Judaism. See A. LEV, THE IMPACT OF THE JEWISH CHAP-
LAINCY 1, 2, 11-13 (1962).
73. THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE U.S.A., MINISTRY TO PERSONS IN THE
ARMED FORCES: A REPORT TO THE 187TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY B-31, (1975) [hereinafter cited as
UPC REPORT]. Church-sponsored ministries that function outside the military's chaplaincy program
are a priority for the UPC, because they "keep alive issues and problems that can be too easily
forgotten or settled on the basis of compromise." Id. at B-27, B-28. This report was presented by a
task force assigned to evaluate ministry to people in the armed forces, in contrast to the CJC report,
supra note 68, which was designed to aid in recruiting chaplains.
74. See infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
75. UPC REPORT, supra note 73, at B-28, B-29. The UPC hopes that its ecclesiastical endorse-
ment power acts as a countervailing force against the military system, which the Report notes may
pressure chaplains who "desire to be primarily loyal to their role as clergy,. . . to resolve conflict in
favor of the military." Id. The United Church of Christ is similarly concerned that conflicts between
chaplains' military and religious interests are resolved in favor of the military. See UCC REPORT,
supra note 26, at 71-72. The UCC describes its power to revoke endorsement as the "illusion of
authority," decrying the "powerlessness of the church over against the military, a powerlessness that is
structured into the present system of the chaplaincy." Id. at 69, 70.
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ties to the endorsing institution. The application brochure describes the
chaplain as an "ordained minister in uniform; 'on loan' by the Church to
the Army," and emphasizes that "it is imperative that [a] close relation-
ship be maintained with the parent presbytery and with the Presbyterian
Council."7 ' Administrative and counseling duties are secondary to the
chaplain's "primary calling as a servant of Jesus Christ. '7 7 The UPC
strenuously objects to those features of the chaplaincy system that may
undermine the chaplain's independence, such as participation in military
ceremonies.78 The UPC notes that such performances can be perceived as
"'blessing' war or weapons of war."'17
The UPC Report's resolution to continue in the chaplaincy program is
based primarily on practical considerations, such as lack of funds and
problems of access.80 Its policy statement stresses, however, that "[rleform
in the structures of ministry of the government-supported chaplaincies
should stress freedom from state control, insofar as possible, while main-
taining access to enlisted personnel . . ... " Its recommendations call for
research into the impact of the uniform and rank on pastoral effectiveness
and urge that only chaplains sh ould serve on boards that evaluate and
promote chaplains. The UPC suggests that it, along with other denomina-
tions, should develop chaplain training courses covering issues such as
each "denomination's position on war, peace, and conscience, thp Chris-
tian's right and responsibility to dissent from practices or orders believed
to be immoral or illegal, and the chaplain's role as moral counselor." ' 2
76. THE PRESBYTERIAN COUNCIL FOR CHAPLAINS AND MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE CHAP-
LAINCIES IN THE ARMED FORCES AND THE VETERANS ADMINISTRATION 2, 4. (in use in 1984)
[hereinafter cited as UPC BROCHURE].
77. Id. at 6. See also UPC REPORT, supra note 73, at B-18 (commending recent strengthening of
chaplains' religious image, role, and identification with endorsing churches in new Navy Chaplains
Manual).
78. Id. at B-22-B-23, B-32 (independence also undermined by chaplain's uniform, rank, and
promotion system). The UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 74, describes "turning the chaplain into a
morale officer" as "an abuse of his or her clerical calling," because "morale is fraught with enough
ambiguities to render it a military rather than a religious function," and warns against "the danger of
* sacrificing faith to the fighting spirit." Id.
79. UPC REPORT, supra note 73, at B-22. The UCC Report, supra note 26, at 91, describes
such participation as "a blatant exploitation of the chaplaincy for obvious military purposes of the
command . .. ."
80. UPC REPORT, supra note 73, at B-31.
81. Id. at B-31.
82. Id. at B-32-33. The UPC views its role as including the duty to keep "careful watch on the
state and its secular institutions for the first signs that they are becoming inhumane or destructive of
human persons or that they are creating a 'theological rationale' of their own." UPC, THE PRACTICE
OF HAVING MINISTERS OF OUR CHURCH SERVE AS MILITARY CHAPLAINS PAID BY THE STATE 4
(May 24, 1965).
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C. Wisconsin Evangelical Lutheran Synod's Views
Sifice the outbreak of World War II, the Wisconsin Evangelical Lu-
theran Synod (WELS) has refused to recommend its ministers to the mili-
tary, on the ground that pastors "would not be free to obey the direction
of Christ its Head alone; but would also. . . be subject to the direction of
the Government . ... - Although WELS accepts government responsi-
bility for military members' physical fitness, it maintains that their spiri-
tual welfare is solely the Synod's concern: "We want our members to be
loyal citizens and good soldiers, but we also pray that they remain faithful
Christians and loyal soldiers of the Cross."" WELS has tried to find al-
ternate means to minister to its members in the military, including provid-
ing one or two civilian chaplains to forces overseas, referring military per-
sonnel to "contact pastors" near military installations, and sending
"ministry-by-mail" literature and worship services on tape to military
members.85 Yet the success of WELS efforts to develop alternatives to the
chaplaincy program depends on contingencies that are unpredictable and
outside its control.8 6 Access to members on bases depends on military co-
operation; no set military policies govern such access.87 Contact pastors
may use chapels and other military resources only when military chap-
83. Herrmann, Some Considerations on the Constitutionality of the United States Military Chap-
laincy, 14 AM. U.L. REV. 24, 33 & n.32 (1964) (citing THE CONFERENCE OF PRESIDENTS OF THE
EVANGELICAL LUTHERAN JOINT SYNOD OF WISCONSIN AND OTHER STATES, THE CHAPLAINCY
QUESTION 2, 3 (1954) ("[T]o close an eye to Christ in order to carry out the Government's direction,
to sacrifice faithfulness to Christ for loyalty to the Government's intention: these Government-fostered
tendencies in the chaplaincy give birth to a religious practice that is displeasing to Christ and harmful
to his Church.")). Refusal to participate is based upon "scriptural principles and established Lu-
theran practice," which include the beliefs that the Army chaplaincy application and appointment
process conflict with WELS' "doctrinal stand on the divinity of the pastoral call;" that duties imposed
by governmental regulations "are in direct violation of the divine call of a Lutheran pastor;" that
governmental regulation and remuneration "is not in harmony with Scripture" because it violates the
principle of separation of church and state; and that the "spirit of doctrinal indifferentism pervades
the regulations governing Army Chaplains and fosters unionism and panprotestantism." Affidavit of
Rev. Carl H. Mischke [President and spiritual leader of WELS], Katcoff v. Marsh, 582 F. Supp. 463
(1984). WELS' belief in church-state separation rests on Martin Luther's resistance to efforts of
human authorities to rule people's souls. Ruff, What Is a Lutheran?, in RELIGIONS IN AMERICA 112,
120 (L. Rosten ed. 1963).
84. THE WELS MILITARY SERVICES COMMITTEE, A HISTORY OF SPIRITUAL SERVICES FOR
MILITARY PERSONNEL 3 (1982) [hereinafter cited as WELS HISTORY].
85. Id. at 16. As of September 1982, WELS has maintained two full-time chaplains in Europe
and has referred military personnel in Asia to WELS missionaries. While the U.S Army spends about
forty-three dollars yearly per member of the military community, WELS spends only approximately
six dollars and eighty cents on each member per year. Id.; Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226, 229.
86. Chaplain Renz, a civilian chaplain in Europe from 1973-1982, explained that WELS civilian
chaplains in Europe were denied the access privileges they had been granted in Vietnam. WELS
HISTORY, supra note 84, at 13. Censorship restrictions on periodicals during wartime may make
ministry by mailings unreliable.
87. The chaplain's ability to establish a schedule of services at U.S. military chapels depends on
cooperation of key military personnel. Id.
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lains are not using them.88 Although the Synod has some control over
funding and contact between home pastors and their soldier members,
these contingencies may significantly limit pastoral services.
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS
Because military life could deprive personnel of the opportunity to
practice their religion, it seems appropriate, and indeed constitutionally
required,89 for the government to provide some military chaplaincy pro-
gram.90 That program, however, must be constrained by the Constitu-
tion's prohibition of the establishment of religion, 1 which requires that
government action neither intrude upon religion's proper domain nor al-
low religion to infringe upon government's domain.92 The courts have
drawn two principles from this requirement of nonestablishment. The
first forbids excessive government entanglement with religion. The sec-
88. Id.
89. The establishment clause prohibits government inhibition of religion. Lemon v. Kurtzman,403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). The free exercise clause permits government to accommodate individuals'
religious needs. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S, 306, 313-14 (1952); see also supra note 13.90. In Katcoff, however, the plaintiffs argued against government funding of any such system. See
supra note 11 and accompanying text.
91. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion," U.S. CONsr. amend. I,§ 1.
92. The Court in Engel v. Vitale asserted: "[The] first and most immediate purpose [of the Estab-lishment Clause] rested on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy govern-
ment and to degrade religion." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). The Court has attempted toimplement Jefferson's 1802 declaration that the First Amendment's purpose was to build "a wall of
separation between Church and State," PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERsON 518-19 (1943). See,
e.g., Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (establishment clause prohibits govern-
ment from aiding religions, influencing person's religious beliefs, taxing to support religious activities,
and participating in affairs of religious organizations); see also Engel, 370 U.S. at 429 (freedom of
religion depends on separation principle); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222(1963) (core rationale of Establishment Clause is to prevent fusing of governmental and religiousfunctions); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) (public school arrangement
which released students to attend religious classes in those schools violated separation principle).93. The test for excessive entanglement requires that programs that bring about administrative
relationships between public and religious bodies preserve "the autonomy and freedom of religiousbodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion." Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 672(1970). Programs that require government administration, planning, or surveillance of religion engen-der two risks: one, the risk of government direction of churches, Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,621-22 (1971) (state supervision of aid to parochial schools entangles government with religion,
threatening government direction of churches); see also N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440U.S. 490, 504 (1979) (Congress did not intend N.L.R.B. to have jurisdiction over parochial school
teachers because government could then intrude into religious concerns); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.228, 255 (1982) (state charitable solicitation act's reporting requirements present dangers of excessivegovernment direction of churches); Walz, 397 U.S. at 675 (emphasizing danger of continuing surveil-lance); and two, the risk of politicizing religion, thus creating undue political fragmentation along
sectarian lines, lValz, 397 U.S. at 695 (Harlan, J.); see also Larson, 456 U.S. at 253 (statute impos-ing reporting requirements on some religious organizations but not others engenders risk of politiciz-ing religion). Justice Brennan emphasizes that the dangers of entanglement threaten to subvert both
religious liberty and the strength of secular government. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 649 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). The excessive entanglement standard also prohibits infusing religious bodies with secular
power. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
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ond requires government to be neutral, in effect and intent, toward all
religions and between religion and nonreligion.9 4
Commentators have for centuries been concerned about the corruptive
influence government exerts on religion when these principles of
nonentanglement and neutrality are compromised.95 This concern is par-
94. Justice Marshall described the central purpose of this clause as "ensuring government neu-
trality in matters of religion." Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 449 (1971) (statute limiting
conscientious objectors to those objecting to all wars reflects neutral secular purpose); see also Walz,
397 U.S. at 694 (Harlan, J.) ("Government must neither legislate to accord benefits that favor reli-
gion over nonreligion, nor sponsor a particular sect, nor try to encourage participation in or abnega-
tion of religion"). Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Larson, has said: "The clearest command
of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over
another." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244, 246-47 (1982) (though facially neutral, charitable
solicitation statute produces non-neutral effects, implying preference for or against certain denomina-
tions). See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106-08 (1968) (anti-evolutionstatute enacts fundamen-
talist convictions in violation of neutrality principle); infra notes 118, 123, 124; see also Pfeffer,
Freedom andlor Separation: The Constitutional Dilemma of the First Amendment, 64 MINN. L.
REV. 561, 566 (1980) (antiestablishment is generally considered to prohibit "laws setting up a church,
preferring one religion over another, or aiding religion"); Giannella, supra note 13, at 517-18 (ex-
plaining establishment clause principle of government neutrality in religious matters as including twin
values of religious voluntarism and political non-involvement; suggesting that government neutrality
in religious matters may justify or even compel aid to religion to relieve burdens upon free exercise
created by government regulation). But see P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW 18 (1962) (argu-
ing for principle of strict neutrality, which would prohibit using "religion" as category to direct gov-
ernmental action).
The principles of neutrality and nonentanglement are, with some variations in terminology, dis-
cussed together in both cases and scholarship. Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (tax
exemption reflects government's benevolent neutrality and does not excessively entangle government
with religion); see also id. at 695 (Harlan, J.) (discussing need for both neutrality and nonentangle-
ment to achieve purposes of First Amendment). Justice Brennan cites the principles of separation and
neutrality as serving the purposes of the establishment clause. Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330,
3341-43 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971)
(legislature may act regarding religion only in neutral areas where government does not sponsor,
financially support, or actively involve itself with religion); Note, Toward A Constitutional Definition
of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1056, 1058 (1978) (citing voluntarism and separation as two funda-
mental principles of religion clauses); Comment, A Non-Conflict Approach to the First Amendment
Religion Clauses, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1175, 1192-93 (1983) (establishment clause prohibits govern-
ment advancement of and undue involvement with religion).
95. Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Island, "believed that separation was necessary in
order to protect the church from the danger of destruction which he thought inevitably flowed from
control by even the best-intentioned civil authorities." Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 n.20 (1962).
See also M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1-31 (1965) (establishment clause motivated as much by concerns
about potential for government interference in religious affairs as fear of religious corruption of gov-
ernment); P. MILiER, ROGER WILuAMS: His CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 89
(1953) (discussing Williams' vision of church unyielding to politics or expedience as "only reliable
measure of the Christian community"). For a relatively recent analysis of the establishment clause
reflecting Williams' view, see Katz, Radiations from the Church Tax Exemption, 1970 Sup. CT.
REV. 93, 96-97 (establishment clause allows government aid to, but not infringement on, religion).
Both Madison and Jefferson interpreted the purposes of the establishment clause differently than
did Williams. Madison thought that ensuring religion and government's freedom from each other
would advance both of their interests by preventing a corrupting coalition and by assuring competition
between religious sects. J. MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESS-
MENTS (1785), reprinted in part in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63-72 (1947). Jefferson
believed that the establishment clause requires a strict separation of church and state to protect the
state from religion's corrupting influence. Kurland, The Irrelevance of the Constitution: The Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment and the Supreme Court, 24 ViL. L. REV. 3, 11 (1978). Scholars
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ticularly appropriate in the context of the military chaplaincy, where gov-
ernment's authority creates the potential for extensive influence over reli-
gious activity. While the permissibility of the degree and nature of
government involvement with religion is also colored by the principle of
military necessity,98 this military necessity principle-though permitting
some restrictions on the free exercise of religion-does not permit trans-
forming religion to comport with military interest in discipline and uni-
formity. The D.C. Circuit has likewise stated that only the free exercise
mandate, not secular interest, can justify maintaining religious personnel
and institutions in the military, a phenomenon which is otherwise pro-
scribed by the establishment clause.97
have noted that the Supreme Court's analyses at first favored the Jeffersonian and Madisonian ap-
proaches, L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-4, at 818 (1978), but seem to have
"veered to ...Williams' argument in Walz v. Tax Commission, and [have] wobbled ever since."
Kurland, supra at 12 (footnote omitted). See also Comment, supra note 94, at 1192 (1983) (though
modifying strict separation into accommodation approach, Court is still concerned with undue involve-
ment of government with religion).
96. According to this principle, although military personnel are not excluded from First Amend-
ment protection, "[tihe fundamental necessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposi-
tion of discipline, may render permissible within the military that which would be constitutionally
impermissible outside it." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974); see also Chappell v. Wallace,
462 U.S. 296, 300-04 (1983) (judiciary accords Congress great deference over military affairs). The
extent to which the military necessity principle permits constitutional rights to be restricted, and the
fact that the military has the authority to determine this issue, is controversial. See Note, Goldman v.
Secretary of Defense: Restricting the Rights of Military ServicemeMbers, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 881, 899
& nn.78-80 (1985) (Supreme Court has not consistently stated the degree of judicial deference that
doctrine requires); Note, Making Intramilitary Tort Law More Civil: A Proposed Reform of the
Feres Doctrine, 95 YALE L. J. 992 (1986) (arguing courts should recognize former service person's
causes of action alleging intentional or constitutional torts, mediated by deference to dual concerns of
limited adequacy of intramilitary remedy and military's need for obedience). Compare Orloff v. Wil-
loughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953) (Congress and President have authority to set up channels to
resolve grievances in the military; judiciary is not to interfere with legitimate Army matters just as the
Army is not to intervene in judicial matters); Chappell, 462 U.S. at 304 (1984) (unique disciplinary
needs and structure of military argue for judicial abstention from fashioning a remedy in military
case); and Goldman v. Weinberger, 54 U.S.L.W. 4298 (Mar. 25, 1986) (First Amendment does not
require military to accommodate wearing of religious apparel "in the face of its views that [it] would
detract from uniformity sought by the dress regulations); with Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67(1981) (Court maintains ultimate responsibility to decide constitutional questions in area of military
affairs, but Constitution requires deference to Congress in military context) and Goldman, 54
U.S.L.W. at 4304 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Constitution requires "rational foundation for assertions
of military necessity when they interfere with the free exercise of religion") and Anderson v. Laird,
466 F.2d 283, 295 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 1076 (1972) (military interests may not
abolish constitutional rights). See generally Hirshhorn, supra note 6; Note, supra note 6; Comment,
Free Speech in the Military, 65 MARQ. L. REV. 660 (1982); Warren, The Bill of Rights in the
Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962) (military personnel should not have to sacrifice basic
rights in military); Levine, The Doctrine of Military Necessity in Federal Courts, 89 MIL. L. REV. 3,
23-24 (1980) (under doctrine of military necessity, significant governmental interest in upholding
discipline may override constitutional considerations).
97. Anderson, 466 F.2d at 290 & n.36. On the issue of restraint on free exercise, see id. at 296(free exercise test applied to military interests is no less rigorous). The Department of Defense's
recent policy statement "that requests for accommodation of religious practices should be approved by
commanders when accommodation will not have an adverse impact on military readiness, unit cohe-
sion, standards, or discipline," DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DIRECTIVE ON ACCOMMODATION OF RE-
LIGIOtS PRACTICES WITHIN MILITARY SERVICES, No. 1300.17 (June 18, 1985), illustrates the mili-
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Courts routinely apply the three-part Lemon test-which requires that
government action have a secular purpose, neither advance nor inhibit re-
ligion as a primary effect, nor excessively entangle government with reli-
gion 9 -to establishment clause cases.99 Although this test incorporates the
neutrality and nonentanglement principles, it cannot cogently address
these problems in the context of the military chaplaincy program.100 Un-
like most areas of government involvement with religion, it is the religious
purpose of the chaplaincy that makes the program constitutional.101 But to
the extent that the chaplaincy serves secular interests that do not coincide
with religious interests, government is using religion for its own purposes,
tary's awareness of the free exercise issue. Justice O'Connor proposes a two-part inquiry for judging
a free exercise claim in the military: First, is the Government's asserted interest against the individ-
ual's religiously based claim "of unusual importance?"; second, will this interest be substantially
harmed by granting an exemption of the type requested by the individual? Goldman, 54 U.S.L.W. at
4306 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Scholars have suggested that courts adopt a two-tiered approach to examine challenged military
regulations. This approach, if applied to the chaplaincy program, would require extreme judicial
deference to regulations necessary to the military's primary defense function, but would mandate full
scrutiny of those regulations that only tangentially affect the military's ability to function. See Note,
Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, supra note 96, at 917; cf. Note, Federal Judicial Review of Mili-
tar) Administrative Decisions, 51 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 612, 622 (1983) (courts should review purely
adminstrative military decisions, but not decisions closely related to military's defense function). I
would argue that the chaplaincy would fall into the second tier; for its alleged function of providing
for free exercise does not pertain to the military's primary defense function. Such approaches that
allocate deference according to the proximity of the regulation to the military defense function provide
no guidance for drawing lines, however.
98. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (1971).
99. See Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc. 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914 (1985).
In Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3336 (1983), the Court considered the "unambiguous and
unbroken history" of using legislative chaplains and the lack of controversy throughout this history in
determining that such use did not violate the establishment clause. In contrast to legislative chaplains,
however, the military chaplaincy has been controversial throughout its history. See, e.g., Abington v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 296 n.71 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (comparing opinions throughout
American history on advisability of government-financed military chaplaincy); see also Note, The
United States Military Chaplaincy Program: Another Seam in the Fabric of Our Society?, 59 NoTRE
DAME L. REv. 181, 199-200 & nn.76-77 (1983) (lack of consistent historical acceptance of chap-
laincy); Herrmann, supra note 83, at 26-29 (opposition to chaplaincy has historically been from
religious advocates). However, the Marsh criteria of historical status has not emerged generally as a
prominent criteria for establishment clause analysis. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479,
2492 (1985) (majority opinion does not consider historical status of voluntary school prayer in render-
ing statute unconstitutional, instead considers whether state "intended to characterize prayer as a
favored practice").
100. The Supreme Court has recognized that establishment clause principles formulated on a
case-by-case basis may have limited meaning as general principles. Walz v. Tax Comm., 397 U.S.
664, 669 (1970). The military context of the chaplaincy program must be considered in developing
appropriate establishment clause analysis. The Katcoff court recognizes that if the chaplaincy were
evaluated without considering its military context, it would fail the Lemon test. The court, therefore,
considering the context of the program, does not apply such a test. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 232-33.
101. See supra note 13. Justice O'Connor's modification of the secular purpose test into a test
which asks whether "government's actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of religion," Lynch v.
Donnelly, 104 S. Ct. 1355, 1368 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring), applied by the Court in Wallace
v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2490 (1985), could more usefully be applied to the military chaplaincy
than the traditional Lemon test.
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in violation of the establishment clause.10 2 Further, the chaplaincy permis-
sibly advances religion in the limited sense that, without some provisions
for religious practice, much religious exercise would be inhibited in the
military. The third prong of the Lemon test is useful in evaluating the
chaplaincy, however. Avoiding government entanglement with religion is
just as important in the context of the military chaplaincy as in other
contexts.
The unique goal of meeting military personnel's religious needs re-
quires establishment clause analysis both to recognize the need for govern-
ment involvement with religion and to scrutinize the neutrality of that
involvement and the extent to which that involvement succeeds in keeping
secular and religious realms distinct.103
A. The Entanglement Prohibition
The nonentanglement principle prohibits government involvement with
religion that creates illegitimate influence or authority of one over the
other. 0 ' In the military chaplaincy, government influence threatens the
religious independence of chaplains," ° impermissibly subsuming religions'
goals within the military's agenda.108
Intrusive government monitoring and administration, which pervade the
military chaplaincy system, violate the establishment clause entanglement
prohibition by undermining religious independence. 107 The government
102. Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 281 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (gov-
ernment cannot use religious exercise to promote secular purposes). Such use of religion would violate
what Justice Brennan notes is a "purpose of separation and neutrality[-]to prevent the trivialization
and degradation of religion by too close an attachment to the organs of government." Marsh, 103 S.
Ct. at 3342 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (state cannot
require posting Ten Commandments in classroom to serve avowed secular purposes).
103. As the text suggests, the entanglement and neutrality problems raised by the military chap-.
laincy program are not completely independent; at some points, neutrality may be limited by a desire
to avoid entanglement or the entanglement principle may be relaxed to achieve greater neutrality. For
analytic clarity, however, the two will be discussed separately.
104. However, "[n]o perfect or absolute separation is really possible." Walz, 397 U.S. at 670. See
also id. at 692 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[w]hether Government grants or withholds the exemp-
tions, it is going to be involved with religion"). Recognition of the limits of any nonentanglemcnt
policy has led to the "excessive entanglement" standard. Walz, 397 U.S. at 670. See supra note 93(discussing this standard). The Court has recognized that in parochial schools the government can set
minimum standards to further the secular purpose of quality education, Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), but cannot regulate the ideological character of the schools' instruction, Lemon
v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971).
105. The UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 94 concludes "[t]he military milieu is bound to trans-
form the chaplain when the chain of command exerts the strongest controls, officer status offers attrac-
tive rewards, the military community becomes his support system, and certain dimensions of his min-
isterial role are repressed or penalized."
106. The United Church of Christ notes that the cost to the churches of the government's care of
religion may be "the perversion of its unique mission," UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 36, and that,
if the church's purpose conflicts with the Army's mission, the purpose will be modified, id. at 72.
107. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 255 (1982) (state inspection and evaluation of religious
content of religious organization threatens to produce excessive government direction of churches).
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decides which religious institutions may endorse chaplaincy candidates,
develops its own criteria for those chaplains,"'8 appoints the Chief of
Chaplains, decides what religious "equipment" is "authorized," how
funds should be allocated,1" 9 and when facilities are available. The com-
mander, a secular authority, supervises chaplain activities within his or
her command.110 The authority of commanding officers to write chaplain
promotion recommendations constitutes government control over religion
and engenders a conflation of religious interests into secular military in-
terests."" Finally, government administered and required chaplain train-
ing courses orient the chaplain's focus toward the military's agenda." 2
The entanglement principle also prohibits government from delegating
secular responsibilities to religious institutions. It is intended to prevent
Justice Douglas asserts that one aspect of entanglement is that "[tihe intrusion of government into
religious schools through grants, supervision, or surveillance [which] may . . . . depriv[el a teacher,
under threat of reprisals, of the right to. . . use the teaching of. . . subjects to inculcate a religious
creed or dogma." Lemon, 403 U.S. at 634 (Douglas, J., concurring). The government's control over
the chaplaincy system constitutes a subtle but definitive judgment on the nature of religious faith in
the military. See supra notes 19-27, 37-41 and accompanying text. Because the chaplaincy programs
virtually monopolize the opportunity to minister in the military, government control over these pro-
grams is particularly pernicious. Cf. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) 679, 728-29 (1871) (courts
must defer to religious institution's decisions on religious components of property disputes); Jones v.
Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602, 603 (1979) (court cannot resolve church property disputes on the basis of
religious doctrine and practice).
108. The United Church of Christ asserts that the military's power to review each chaplain can-
didate, AR 601-126(8)(c)(1), amounts to a military endorsement: "Here again in the tangled church-
state relationship of the chaplaincy the Government has assumed the power to exploit the chaplaincy
for secular and military ends by screening candidates according to military aptitudes and attributes,
thereby eroding the church's authority to determine personal and other prerequisites for ministry."
UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 63.
109. See text accompanying note 42; contra Walz, 397 U.S. at 692 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(government influence over allocation of church resources violates nonentanglement principle).
110. See supra notes 37-40 and accompanying text. Some commander discretion to control and
coordinate clergy activity based on military security needs may be unavoidable. Discretion, however,
to appropriate such activities for military interests should not be permitted.
111. Officers' evaluations will inevitably reflect military interest; for officers have neither the
knowledge of a religion nor the constitutional authority to evaluate the chaplain's ministry. Evalua-
tions will focus on the chaplain's administrative role or ability to harmonize with the military commu-
nities. Thus, aspiring chaplains too will focus on these concerns, and are, in fact, instructed to do so,
THE CHAPLAIN, supra note 10, at ch.2-1, thereby assimilating government's agenda into religion.
The Katcoff court's effort to avoid the entanglement issue by asserting that "[piromotion of a chaplain
within the military ranks is based solely on his military performance and not on his effectiveness as a
cleric," Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226, is, in fact, symptomatic of the very conflation of secular and reli-
gious concerns it attempts to avoid. Government cannot constitutionally evaluate the chaplaincy based
either on its ministerial effectiveness-it has no such authority over religion-nor on its own secular
criteria, because this would contradict the religious purpose of the chaplaincy to provide ministry to
military personnel.
112. The more chaplains advance, the more they are required to learn about the military mission;
within this framework they develop the "expertise" necessary to coordinate and command subordinate
chaplains. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. Some military training may be necessary for
chaplains to function in the military, but the current training, in subjects such as "Soviet doctrine[,]
organization, tactics, and equipment from the front level to regiment, with emphasis on Soviet capabil-
ities and the ways that AirLand Battle doctrine can be applied against them," ADVANCED PROGRAM,
supra note 44, at 9, goes beyond this.
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religious institutions from becoming enmeshed with political decision-
making powers and government from abdicating its reasoned decision-
making powers to religious institutions.113
In the military, government delegates to the chaplain a range of non-
and quasi-religious functions," 4 such as advising the commander on the
moral basis of command policy and teaching Human Self Development
courses."1 5 The military's authority over promotion compounds the entan-
glement danger of committing military responsibilities to religious author-
ities. Even if chaplains were granted the authority to evaluate the morality
of the command policy, they might find it difficult to make this judgment
within the military structure based upon religious criteria. 1 ' In addition,
commanders have the discretion to decide whether or not to follow the
advice of religious authorities on this policy.111 Therefore, the pretense of
chaplain judgment may merely legitimize the moral basis of the military
process.
B. The Neutrality Principle
The military chaplaincy program permits involvement between govern-
ment and religion in the unique military context. While the neutrality
principle generally mandates that government should avoid expressing a
preference either between religion and non-religion or among various
sects, 1 s the government's unique ability to provide opportunities for reli-
gious exercise in the military justifies limiting the neutrality inquiry, to
113. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc , 459 U.S. 116, 127 (1982) (providing churches right to veto
government grants of liquor licenses violates entanglement prohibition of "enmesh[ing] churches in the
processes of government"). See supra note 3.
114. Whether or not a function is perceived as religious may vary among denominations. Clearly,
however, religions could better sustain their integrity if they themselves decided which functions were
appropriately religious.
115. ARMY REG. 165-20 1 2-3d (1976). The United Church of Christ task force found that
assigning chaplains to teach Human Self Development courses was problematic "The chaplain is
assigned to teach a compulsory educational program run by the commander, using a secular orienta-
tion and intended to increase military efficiency, discipline, and well-being." UCC REPORT, supra
note 26, at 73. Other secular functions required of chaplains include participation in military or
patriotic ceremonies, and ensuring that chaplains foster chaplain officer recruiting.
116. The UCC REPORT, supra note 26, at 47, argues, for example, that the chaplain, closely
identified with the military and its mission, will not be able to make balanced judgments about the
religious sincerity and moral integrity of youth claiming conscientious objection. Additionally ques-
tionable is, as the UPC asks, whether the chaplain's voice about the morality of "structural and
procedural matters affecting the entire condition of the military [can] be heard within a total institu-
tional matrix." UPC REPORT, supra note 73, at B-23-24.
117. Commanders may choose between different chaplains' potentially diverging advice, which
could both foster political divisiveness and constitute preference of one religion over another.
118. See Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2914, 2918 (1985) (state statute providing employees
with absolute right not to work on their chosen Sabbath impermissibly advances particular religious
practice); Wallace v. Jaffree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2492 (1985) (state statute endorsing "voluntary prayer"
in school characterizes prayer as favored practice, violating establishment clause neutrality principle);
see also id. at 2501 (O'Conor, J., concurring).
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consideration of the latter concern for neutrality among religions. The
neutrality principle must guard against two dangers produced by the mili-
tary context: First, the military can easily manipulate its discretionary au-
thority as defender of the nation119 to discriminate among religious
groups; and second, the program's funding and religious benefits,120 as
well as its lack of program alternatives, threaten to induce religious insti-
tutions to join the chaplaincy on terms that they would otherwise find
objectionable.
The susceptibility of the soldier to religious indoctrination increases the
importance of government neutrality in the chaplaincy program. Uprooted
from their homes, soldiers are subjected to new stresses and are particu-
larly susceptible to religious influences.12' Here, as in public schools, the
audience is captive and susceptible; state-accommodated religious activities
that could appear to favor one religion over another are therefore particu-
larly intolerable. 22
Government neutrality requires that government action neither in-
tend '123 nor effect 2 4 the advancement or inhibition of one religion over
119. See supra notes 17, 37-40, 96 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 16, 72, and text accompanying note 80.
121. Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 227; see also THE REsERVE CHAPLAIN, supra note 16, at 5 (chaplains
"assist [reservists,] many of them very young adults, [to] achieve a richer and more complex life")
(emphasis added). The more susceptible the soldier, the greater the effect of non-neutral action.
122. If the claimants are children, avoidance of sectarianism is axiomatic because primary school
children are presumably susceptible both to "religious indoctrination," Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 686 (1971) (college students are less impressionable than elementary and secondary school chil-
dren to religious indoctrination) and to peer pressure, Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 290 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (children, tending to conform, unlikely to exercise right to
be exempt from school prayer). See also Wallace, 105 S. Ct. at 2503 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(distinguishing Presidential proclamations from school prayer on basis that former are received in
non-coercive atmosphere and directed at adults, "who presumably are not readily susceptible to un-
willing religious indoctrination"); Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. 3330, 3335 (1983) (adult state
legislators not susceptible to indoctrination).
123. If the Court discerns that despite a professed secular purpose the intent of a statute is really
to advance or burden religion, or that the professed purpose could be achieved without affecting reli-
gion, the challenged action violates the establishment clause. See, e.g., Larsen v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 246 (1982) (Court finds intent to discriminate in public solicitation reporting requirements);
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 108-09 (1968) (anti-evolution statute reflects fundamentalist
convictions in violation of neutrality principle).
124. Abington, 374 U.S. at 282-84 (Brennan, J., concurring) (effect of proposed sectarian prayers
and public Bible reading offends some sects, violating government neutrality); Stone v. Graham, 449
U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (because Ten Commandments are sacred text in Jewish and Christian faiths, state
cannot require them to be posted in public classroom). If the Court finds a discrete secular goal
independent of all religious concerns, and no discriminatory intent, it may not require completely
neutral effects on religion. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452-54 (1971) (valid
secular purpose of statute limiting draft exemptions to draftees objecting to all wars justifies potential
non-neutral effects between religions); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (local school
boards' lending textbooks to all children in public and parochial schools constitutional because benefits
flow to all children). Actions that harmonize with but do not favor beliefs held by some religions may
be permissible. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (reg-
ulation that harmonizes with religious canon does not always violate establishment clause); see also
Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S. Ct. at 3335-36 (considers fact that Founding Fathers perceived legislative
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others. Hence, the intent and effect of the military chaplaincy program
must be to provide, to the greatest possible extent, equal opportunity for
religious exercise within the constraints of military security and the entan-
glement prohibition." 5 Some disparate effects may be inevitable, but they
can only be justified constitutionally if necessary to further military secur-
ity interests or to avoid excessive entanglement.
The coercive structure and specific regulations of the military chap-
laincy program affect different religions differently. The structure inhibits
the exercise of many distinctive practices in religious doctrine and belief.
The disparate religious views about the chaplaincy program discussed
above call the program's neutrality into question.128
The government coerces chaplain identification with the military by in-
tegrating chaplains into the command structure. Because religions differ in
their perceptions of the military, the effects of this implicit identification
with a military patriotic agenda vary. 27 Because promotion is based on
commander evaluations of chaplains, religious institutions may have mini-
mal authority over chaplains' relationship to this agenda. 128 Similarly, re-
ligions may differ in their acceptance of the secular duty requirements.
The military chaplaincy system likewise infringes on religions dispa-
rately by promoting a pluralist, ecumenical religious environment."2 9 The
program's structure-where commanders control religious resource alloca-
tion and hence access to ministry-may encourage chaplains to participate
in the favored ecumenical services. This offends the neutrality principle
both by its preference for ecumenicism as a religious principle and by" its
disparate impact-some religions are more accepting of ecumenicism than
others.1 30 Other potentially discriminatory effects flow more subtly from
invocation as harmonizing with tenants of some or all religions in holding practice constitutional).
125. See supra notes 96, 104 and accompanying text.
126. See generally Abington 374 U.S. at 284-86 (Brennan, J., concurring) (religions' disparate
views of required prayer and Bible reading in class found to be evidence of school prayer's unconstitu-
tionality). See also Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 299 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1076 (1972) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (government's assertion that purpose of compulsory chapel-
church attendance in military academy is wholly secular cited by religious groups as "'a shocking'
claim to debase and manipulate religious worship as a mere instructional tool"); id. at 303 (court
bases rejection of compulsory church attendance in military academies in part on opinions of church
leaders).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 65, 79.
128. The most substantial potential sanction is withdrawal of endorsement-a radical and costly
solution.
129. This emphasis borders on the "common core" solution, which the Court has rejected as
offensive to some religions. See Abington, 374 U.S. at 286-87 & n.65 (Brennan, J., concurring) (non-
sectarian religious practices violate establishment clause). The WELS believes that the military chap-
laincy, "fosterling] unionism and panprotestantism," conflicts with scriptural principles and estab-
lished Lutheran practice. Plaintiff's Affidavit of Rev. Carl H. Mischke 3, Katooff v. Marsh, 582 F.
Supp. 463 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), affyd & remanded, 755 F.2d 223 (2d. Cir. 1985).
130. See generally L. RosTow, REzGrONS IN AMERICA (1963); W. RusCe, EcUmENicIsM-A
MOVEMENT TOWARD CHURCH UNITY (1985); P. CROW, CHRISTIAN UNITY: MATRIX FOR Ms-
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the chaplaincy program's structure. For example, the integration of the
chaplain into the military may dissuade those leaders of religious groups
who do not want to be closely identified with the military agenda from
applying.
The specific regulations themselves also discriminate among religions,
create non-neutral effects,"' and provide an opportunity for secular au-
thorities to discriminate.1 2 Government power to approve both the reli-
gious agencies and the applicants they endorse 33 likewise grants power to
differentiate between religions. The system's applicant endorsement crite-
ria makes it harder for religions that do not encourage advanced secular
education to provide qualified applicants.13 4 The regulations hinder the
ability of some denominations more than others to maintain their distinc-
tive practices.13 5 Other regulations, such as those that prefer ecumencial
Protestant services,18 are themselves facially discriminatory.
IV. CONTRACT CLERGY: A PROPOSAL FOR STRUCTURAL REFORM
Only a structural change in the current system can alleviate its uncon-
stitutional lack of neutrality and excessive entanglement. Piecemeal modi-
fications of regulations will not significantly loosen the military's grip on
religion. Clearly, no system that seeks to meet religious needs of military
personnel can completely eliminate these problems. Military constraints
make impossible a replication of the religious opportunities available in
civil society: At a minimum, ministry schedules must be coordinated with
military schedules. However, alternative systems could more fairly medi-
ate government's potentially conflicting goals-providing for personnels'
religious needs; maintaining neutrality and non-entanglement; and ensur-
ing military security. A civilian contract clergy system could accomplish
SION (1982).
131. Some regulations, such as prohibiting distribution of literature that attacks other religions'
beliefs and practices, ARMY REG. 165-20 4-15 (1977), may, in order to protect fundamental rights
of some religions, have disparate effects.
132. See supra notes 27-28, 45 and accompanying text.
133. The Armed Services Chaplains Board has the power to reject those applicants who do not
possess the "degree of demonstrated aptitude for the military service and . . . the personal attributes
considered requisite to a successful career as a Regular Army chaplain." ACLU REPORT, supra note
27, at 5-8 (citing ARMY REG. 601-26(8)(f).
134. See supra notes 26, 61.
135. While some of these regulations may simply result from limited military resources, they may
also reflect the military's encouragement of homogeneity and conformity in its system. See supra notes
19-20, 45-46 and accompanying text.
136. While the facially discriminatory regulations that prefer general Protestant services over
Protestant denominational ones may be justifiable in terms of maximizing efficiency in providing reli-
gious opportunity, such government action that actively prefers some religions over others is particu-
larly offensive to establishment clause concerns. A less offensive means to accomplish the same end
may be for regulations to prioritize the services that the greatest number of military personnel would
attend. This would not, however, eliminate the problem of equal access for minority religions.
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this fairer mediation by cutting the tendon-the integration of the chap-
lain into the military command structure-which sustains the grip. Limit-
ing military authority to that necessary for security would allow chaplains
to focus on their legitimate role of providing for military personnel's reli-
gious needs.
Precedents for such a system exist in the military's current use of auxil-
iary and contract clergy,13 7 illustrating the potential of a civilian contract
clergy system. The mechanisms through which the current system func-
tions can be modified to accommodate a full-scale contract clergy system.
As with any attempt to provide for religious opportunity in the military,
both entanglement and military security concerns will constrain this provi-
sion. Nonentanglement precludes religious authority over secular military
functions, 38 as well as any secular military regulation of religious func-
tions that is not mandated by military security. Likewise, religious partici-
pation in patriotic ceremonies should be restricted."' Rough guidelines
for developing a contract clergy system are outlined below.
Religious bodies should select their contract terms from a "cafeteria"
plan. 40 This would minimize problems of entanglement, because religious
and military authorities would not bargain for contract terms, and would
allow religions to structure their desired ministerial role in the military.
The cafeteria "menu" would contain a range of ministerial roles and re-
source provisions 41 with corresponding military security provisions, so
that the religious institutions could choose those that conform to both the
religion's desired ministry role and its willingness to withstand the corre-
sponding security provisions.1 42 The contract would be the composite of
terms that the religious personnel select.
137. See supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text.
138. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (establishment clause restricts govern-
ment delegation of secular functions to religion). For example, this would preclude the current sys-
tem's requirement that chaplains evaluate the spiritual and moral health of the command, including
the ethical dimensions of command policies, ARMY REG. 165-20 % 2-4(12) (1976), but would not
preclude the military from requesting religious institutions to evaluate religious welfare to ensure that
adequate ministry is provided.
139. While certain religions or clergy may claim that participation in patriotic ceremonies falls
within the scope of their free exercise rights, permitting such participation leaves chaplains vulnerable
to military pressure to participate.
140. The "menu" would be composed of a range of program options from which religions could
choose a combination, the composite of which would become that group's "meal," or ministry
program.
141. Religions should be able to choose the extent to which they want to rely on their own, or
government funds; however, to maintain governmental and religious integrity, the funding term
should not be tied to any other requirements. The funding provision should not go beyond compensat-
ing religions for the added costs of their ministry in the military, as compared to the civilian
environment.
142. If a religious body concludes that the military terms are too intrusive, it may choose alterna-
tive terms that would warrant less intrusions, but still assure access to ministry. While such a choice
may entail a sacrifice of opportunity to minister, the military should have an incentive to offer reason-
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An association of religious and military representatives should work to-
gether to develop the range of contract term options. Representatives from
religious bodies" " would initially formulate terms relevant to their minis-
terial goals; military representatives would initially compose correspond-
ing components of terms necessary for providing both military access to
ministry within the military community and military security. Once this
definitional process is complete,"" religious representatives will select the
terms of the contract and be responsible for the implemention of its
terms.1 4 5 The representatives from the religious bodies would form a con-
tract clergy association; government sources would appoint civilian per-
sonnel to oversee the administrative needs of the contract clergy system in
conjunction with this association. Based upon the contract terms and crite-
ria developed by the religious personnel and military representatives for
allocation and procurement of religious resources,4 6 such personnel would
allocate resources and channel requests from military units for religious
services to appropriate religious bodies. These personnel would also work
with civilian Coordinators of Religious Ministry who would be stationed
in military units.14 7 These coordinators would facilitate the implementa-
tion of contracts by consulting with military and religious personnel.
The ministerial effectiveness of civilian clergy is demonstrated by the
military's current use of civilian clergy.' 48 Because the military currently
employs a wide range of civilian personnel,' 4" it already has the means to
administer civilian workers in the military context. Finally, the contract
able terms because, as they acknowledge, clergypersons have a role in maintaining soldiers' spiritual
welfare.
143. Presumably these bodies will consist of current endorsing agencies, plus other groups who
are precluded under the present system, but whose applicants could meet more lenient standards.
144. The limited cooperation between religion and government envisioned in this plan will not
require the continuous involvement that the excessive entanglement standard finds particularly offen-
sive. See supra note 93.
145. To fulfill the contract terms, the representatives can provide full-time clergy or utilize local
civilian religious leaders. Chaplains currently are encouraged, with commander's consent, to contact
local clergy "to assist in providing complete religious ministry for the command .... " THE CHAP-
LAIN, supra note 10, at ch. 2-10.
146. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
147. The Army's current use of civilian "religious education personnel," ARMY REG. 165-20 2-
10 (1977), provides precedent for such coordinators. The Directors of Religious Education, who nor-
mally are not ordained clergy but who have been trained for religious education, id. at [1 2-10(4), (7),
are responsible for supervising, coordinating, and administering the religious education program,
under the supervision of staff chaplains, id. at 1 2-10(8).
148. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
149. Such positions include education, drug and alcohol, and family assistance counselors. Depart-
ment of Defense Appropriations for 1975: Part 3 Military Personnel: Hearing Before A Subcomm.
of the House Comm. on Appropriation, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., 1025 (1974); see also DEPARTMENT OF
THE ARMY, NONAPPROPRIATED FUNDS AND RELATED AcrTIVrFS, PERSONNEL POLICIES AND PRO-
CEDURES, ARMY REGULATION No. 230-2 (1974).
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terms can provide the military with the minimum restraints necessary to
maintain its security.150
While the new contract clergy system may raise concerns about the
means of determining denominational representation and coverage, this is-
sue could easily be resolved. Establishment clause principles mandate a
method of deciding representation that avoids secular discretionary deci-
sion-making power over religion and that accounts for the societal support
for the religious denominations."' Religious representation based initially
on the religious preferences of the military community would address both
of these principles.1 52 This basis should be modified in two ways: First,
members of denominations should be able to supplement their allocation
with their own resources; and second, because the resources required to
meet an individual's religious needs may be greater if there are fewer
individuals in the group, the amount allocated to the first, for example,
500 individuals of a religious denomination should be greater than the
amount allocated to each subsequent member.
Ministry in a contract clergy system, freed from excessive military con-
trol, should provide greater free exercise opportunities for military person-
nel. Religions could more readily maintain their integrity if they could
choose the forms through which they provide ministry in the military.
The integrity of the military would likewise be enhanced by precluding it
from appropriating religious resources to sustain its own well-being.
The establishment clause problems inherent in providing ministry in
the military do not all disappear with the civilian contract clergy system.
While alleviating the ideological entanglement problem of the military's
grip on religion, this system would still require mechanisms to coordinate
its ministry with the military. Decisions about administration, regulation,
and allocation of resources must be made. Such decisions cannot be made
unilaterally by religious institutions or the military, and" hence must raise
150. This contract system may raise questions of how "disputes over the interpretation of contract
terms are to be resolved. One option would be for the civilian personnel to act as mediators in the
dispute; the second, perhaps if the mediators have failed to resolve the dispute, would be to bring the
dispute to the courts. Courts have managed to apply secular, neutral principles to church property
disputes, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979), and should similarly be able to apply secular contract
terms here.
151. Madison maintained that government should not "interfer[e] with religious belief or behavior
so that each religious faction could compete on its own for adherents." Kurland, supra note 95, at 11.
The Court repeated this principle in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952): "We sponsor an
attitude on the part of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets each
flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal of its dogma."
152. The military's concern that "in the event of war or total mobilization the denominational
breakdown. . . accurately reflect that of the larger-sized Army," Katcoff, 755 F.2d at 226, can still
be met with this system: Just as the Reserve Components Chaplain Program, THE REsERVE CHAP-
LAIN, supra note 16, at 1, currently provides for total mobilization, such a program, modified to the
contract clergy plan, and with quotas reflecting the general population, can still meet the need for
clergy and resources in the event of total mobilization.
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entanglement and neutrality concerns. These administrative establishment
concerns, however, do not compare in magnitude to the current program's
neutrality and ideological entanglement offenses.
CONCLUSION
The military's dominance over religion in the current chaplaincy pro-
gram mars the establishment clause values of neutrality and nonestablish-
ment. Rather than respecting Jefferson's vision of a wall separating the
church and state,158 this dominance allows the military's image of reli-
gion-which reflects its secular interests-to be projected through the
wall, and mirrored in the chaplaincy program. The legitimate purpose of
the chaplaincy program-to protect service personnel's free exercise
rights-should not be an excuse to distort these establishment clause val-
ues. While in a program such as the military chaplaincy the wall, practi-
cally speaking, may not stand tall and wide, the values this image has
come to reflect should still be respected, to the greatest possible extent.
The proposed contract clergy system, unlike the current program, does
squarely address the fundamental purpose of the chaplaincy program-to
permit military personnel to exercise their religions-while respecting the
establishment clause values of neutrality and nonentanglement.
153. See supra note 92.
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